Decline of Parliament

The focus of this essay is Carl Schmitt’s analysis of parliamentary democracy in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Specifically, I engage Schmitt’s claims regarding the foundational principles of parliamentary form, and their absence in the contemporary situation of parliamentary democracy. From Schmitt’s empirical observation that parliament has abandoned its formative principles, I draw what I argue is his best critique of liberalism: The institutional value of parliament has been submitted to the experiential question of whether its ends can be achieved by other means.

Janus

For Schmitt, “discussion” and “openness” are the “essential principles of parliament,” forming the foundation of “all specifically parliamentary arrangements.” In the context of parliamentarism, “discussion” means “an exchange of opinion that is governed by the purpose of persuading one’s opponent through an argument of the truth or justice of something, or allowing oneself to be persuaded of something as true and just [emphasis added].” Parliamentary discussion is “open” in the sense that it is transparent, unrestricted, and “public” in nature (in contrast to “secret politics,” or government behind closed doors). It is also “open” in the implicit sense that it depends on “renouncing a definite result,” and thus operates on the assumption of “the willingness to be persuaded” (i.e., open-mindedness).

As Schmitt emphasizes, discussion cannot be equated with “negotiation,” which is concerned with “calculating particular interests,” rather than “the discovery of what is rationally correct.” In parliament, “laws arise out of a conflict of opinions (not a struggle of interests).” Whereas the object of negotiation is the compromise of “interests,” which are necessarily particular and determined prior to the act of negotiation, the object of discussion is the discovery of “truth” and “justice,” which are necessarily universal and can only be formed through the act of discussion itself. As universals, “truth” and “justice” must unify all differences, and not merely split the difference between them. This is why, as Schmitt insists in The Guardian of the Constitution, “parliament…is supposed to be the scene of a process of transformation, through which the manifold of…conflicts, interests, and opinions is shaped into the unity of a political will.” “Truth” and “justice” in the parliamentary sense represent the dissolution of plurality into unity, and the unified will-formation of the state.

In Schmitt’s view, “belief in parliamentarism, in government by discussion, belongs to the intellectual world of liberalism.” The specific parliamentary principles of discussion and openness derive from the general liberal principle that “the truth can be found through an unrestrained clash of opinion,” or more succinctly, that “truth” is “a mere function of the eternal competition of opinions.” It is only on the basis of liberal relative rationalism that the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and so forth, “life-and-death questions for liberalism,” can be understood as valuable and necessary. Similarly, it is only on the basis of the principles of discussion and openness that the various rules and procedures that constitute parliamentary form – the “independence ” “freedom of speech,” and “immunity of representatives,” the “openness of parliamentary proceedings,” and so forth – have an intelligible meaning and purpose. Parliamentary form is synonymous with discussion and openness.

Yet, as Schmitt observes, on an empirical level, modern parliamentary democracy utterly fails to conform to these principles. Discussion is abandoned and replaced with negotiation: “Genuine discussion ceases. In its place there appears a conscious reckoning of interests and chances for power in the parties’ negotiations.” Openness is eschewed, and “secret politics” makes its return: “Small and exclusive committees of parties or of party coalitions make their decisions behind closed doors.” This coincides with the rise of “modern mass democracy,” which makes “argumentative public discussion” into “an empty formality,” since government by discussion is replaced with government by majority: “It is no longer a question of persuading one’s opponent of the truth or justice of an opinion but rather of winning a majority in order to govern with it.” Under these conditions, parliament becomes a mere rendezvous point for parties to negotiate shared opportunities for power, their real political activity consisting in winning over the “masses” via “propaganda.”

On a theoretical level, Schmitt attributes this development to the inherent, logical contradiction of so-called “liberal democracy,” which can only exist as a temporary, polemical alliance between liberalism and democracy against monarchy. Once monarchy has been defeated, “liberal democracy must decide between its elements.”